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Abstract 
Since their inception, International Domain Names (IDN) have allowed for non-Latin characters to be entered 
into domain names. This feature has led to attackers forging malicious domains which appear identical to the 
Latin counterpart. This is achieved through using non-Latin characters which appear identical to their Latin 
counterpart. This attack is referred to as a Homograph attack. This research continues the work of Hannay and 
Bolan (2009), and Hannay and Baatard (2012), which assessed the mitigation methods incorporated by web 
browsers in mitigating IDN homograph attacks. Since these works, time IDN mitigation algorithms have been 
altered, such as the one used in Mozilla Firefox (Gerv, 2017). This study evaluates browser homograph attack 
mitigation strategies in browsers released post-2011. In this study, we find a high level of effective multi-script 
mitigation across the browser families surveyed. Notable exceptions to this include a single version of Firefox in 
which the mitigation features were not present and ongoing omission of mitigation against single script attacks.  
Keywords:  IDN, homograph, homoglyph, internationalised domain names, browser security, phishing 
BACKGROUND  
Domain name resolution is a technology which allows for IP addresses to be encoded as a string of characters. In 
the early days of Domain Names, the technology only accepted a string of alphanumeric ASCII characters as input 
for domain names (Mockapetris, 1987). This limitation prevented international users from accessing certain 
domains in their respective languages. The introduction of IDNs allowed for specific domain names to be 
accessible to multiple languages through encoding domain names in the Unicode format ("Introduction to IDNs," 
2016). 
The proposed IDN solution made use of UTF-8 character encoding to allow for non-latin characters to be 
displayed. In order to enable existing DNS infrastructure to handle UTF-8 domains a system known as Punycode 
was developed. Punycode provides facility to represent IDNs as regular ASCII domain names, as such no changes 
are required for the majority of infrastructure (Costello, 2003). An example of an IDN would be the  domain name  
☃.com,  which  would  be  represented  as xn--n3h.com when converted to punycode. 
IDN’s have allowed for domains to be accessible from many global users. However, the use of Unicode characters 
has also allowed for phishing attacks to be possible against domain names (Spaulding, Upadhyaya, & Mohaisen, 
2016). The use of non-Latin characters in the domain names allowed users to enter Unicode characters which 
appeared identical to the Latin counterpart, an example of this concept is shown in Figure 1 (Krammer, 2006). As 
a method to counteract these threats, Domains adopted a system known as Punycode to translate any Unicode 
characters into their ASCII representation ("Introduction to IDNs," 2016). Many browsers have adopted this 
technology, allowing users to see when a non-ASCII character is entered into a domain name.  
ɡ g 
U+0047 
Latin Small  Letter G 
U+0261 
Latin Small Letter Script G 
Figure 1 - Example of Homoglyph for "g" 
 
IDN’s have continued to see considerable growth and development in recent years ("Key Numbers," 2016), 
reported that from 2010 to 2015, the total number of registered IDN’s had doubled to 6.8 million. Despite browsers 
incorporating mitigation actions against IDN phishing attacks, they still pose a significant threat. In 2017 browsers 
such as Firefox, Google, Chrome and Opera were found to be vulnerable to a Punycode exploit (Kumar, 2017). 
This attack was possible due to a domain registration exploit, which allows the user to register a domain name in 
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Punycode format with foreign ASCII characters which appear identical to legitimate domains (Tseng, Ku, Lu, 
Wang, & Geng, 2013).  
In the Wild Phishing Attacks using IDN Homographs 
There have been numerous websites aiming to educate the public about the dangers of IDN homograph attacks, 
including еріс.com, аррӏе.com, and gooɡle.com (Hannay, 2012; Maunder, 2017; Zheng, 2017). However, the 
occurrence of homograph usage in confirmed phishing campaigns has been relatively minor with only a single 
confirmed major incident. In August the domain adoḅe.com was registered, subsequently the domain was used to 
distribute the Beta Bot malware, disguised as an update to the Adobe Flash Player software (Mimoso, 2017). 
Links to the website were distributed via email and Skype messages, requesting that the user install the fabricated 
update. Post infection the malware disables security software, then steals financial data and user credentials 
(Kaspersky Lab, 2017).  
PREVIOUS WORK 
Since the introduction of IDN’s, many attacks have been possible due to the use of non-ASCII characters. The 
following literature review gives a brief overview of the types of attacks due to the introduction of IDNs. Table 1 
provides an overview of of the types of attacks, covering single script, mixed-script, and whole script spoofing 
attacks which can take place through character substitution. 
Table 1 – Examples of Single Script, Mixed Script, and Whole Script Spoofing 
Script Type String Punycode Comments 
Single Script EPlC.com EPlC.com Lowercase L used as replacement for 
uppercase I 
Mixed Script еpic.com xn--pic-qdd.com Cryllic replacement used for ‘e’ 
Whole Script еріс.com xn--e1awd7f.com Cryllic replacements used for ‘epic’ 
Mixed-Script Spoofing  
One of the most prevalent attacks which have been proven possible by IDN domains is mixed-script spoofing. 
Mixed-script spoofing generates domain names using visually indistinguishable characters form different script 
groups (Krammer, 2006). These characters appear almost the same to the end user but contain different Unicode 
values. These characters exist within Unicode due to the writing system being used, letter and number encodings, 
and legacy encoding values (Davis & Suignard, 2006). These visually indistinguishable characters are known as 
Homoglyphs. Due to the indistinguishable nature of certain Unicode characters, attackers can easily forge domain 
names which appear to be visually indistinguishable from other legitimate domain names. These domain names 
are referred to as holographs, as they are comprised of various characters from separate scripts. Homographs can 
be used to trick users into going to a malicious domain and as such have been used in various phishing schemes. 
Whole-Script Spoofing & Single-Script Spoofing  
Whole script spoofing and single script spoofing differ from the mixed-script spoofing approach. Due to the 
introduction of IDNs, entire domain names can be spoofed through substituting each character in a domain with 
one of a different script (Krammer, 2006). This attack relies on each character in a domain name having an 
indistinguishable counterpart in another script. Attackers can utilise this coincidence to generate a fully 
indistinguishable domain name. Another attack possible is single script spoofing. This attack uses characters from 
the same script to visually trick users into going to the domain (Gelernter & Herzberg, 2016). These attacks are 
more recognisable to end users, as attackers are not substituting Unicode character from different scripts 
(Krammer, 2006). Instead, domain names are constructed using characters which appear somewhat identical to 
their counterparts. An example of this is Latin ‘o’ and ‘0’, which can be used to forge the domain 
‘www.g00gle.com’.  
DEFENCE TECHNIQUES 
Various defence mechanisms were adopted to address the security issues arising from the introduction of IDNs. 
The most prevalent defence against homograph attacks is displaying Unicode characters in a Punycode format. 
Punycode is used to encode a Unicode string into its appropriate ASCII string representation (Costello, 2003). 
Punycode values are prefixed with xn-- to represent the Unicode string. Values which contain ASCII characters 
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are interpreted as literal strings; however Unicode characters are transformed into their ASCII interpretation 
(Costello, 2003). 
Web Browser Defence  
As a means of defence against homograph threats, web browsers have begun implementing defence measures to 
notify users of potential issues with the domain name. One mitigation technique employed by Internet Explorer 7 
is to display Punycode when mixed-script characters are detected in the domain name (Al Helou & Tilley, 2010). 
Another defensive technique which browsers incorporate is colour coding particular scripts. This technique shows 
characters in different colours based on the script to which they belong.  
Another technique incorporated by Mozilla and Safari is to use a whitelisting approach. This security measure 
displays all IDNs in Punycode unless the domain is registered under a Top Level Domain (TLD) which has 
policies in place to prevent spoofing of the domain. As a requirement for this registering the domain with 
Homoglyphs, the owner must already own the western equivalent of the domain name. Mozilla Firefox still retains 
this whitelisting approach for handling IDNs but has since updated how the Punycode display works in 2012 
(Gerv, 2017). The new algorithm employed determines if the entered domain name contains characters belonging 
the same script or if the characters are being pulled from one of the allowed predefined script combinations (Gerv, 
2017). If the entered domain name is not within the pre-established whitelist for TLDs or if the domain name is 
using characters from illegal script combinations, a Punycode sample is displayed to the user. The previous 
whitelisting approach only remains for compatibility purposes with the domains registered with it but is no longer 
the primary method used for Homograph mitigation (Gerv, 2017). Some browsers such as Opera still retain the 
previous whitelisting approach which Firefox has since abandoned, but remains active for compatibility purposes 
with the registered domains.  
In the Hannay and Baatard (2012) survey, various browsers were assessed to determine their effectiveness in 
mitigating Homograph attacks. In this previous study, numerous versions of the web browsers Mozilla Firefox, 
Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Opera, and Safari were assessed regarding the mitigation techniques used 
against homograph attacks. The results from the previous study demonstrated that later versions certain browsers 
such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox were highly effective in mitigating homograph attacks, while the 
latest versions of Internet Explorer and Safari were still vulnerable to some attacks at the time of the study. 
In recent versions of browsers such as Firefox, the algorithm used to display Punycode has been altered. This 
modification indicates that later versions may not have the same homograph mitigation methods applied. This 
research updates the results seen in the Hannay and Baatard (2012) study by analysing the mitigation techniques 
adopted by browser versions released between 2011 and 2017. Through performing this investigation, the author 
answers the question of if mitigation techniques have been applied to browser versions post-2011 and if changes 
to the mitigation functions resulted in further vulnerabilities with certain versions.  
RESEARCH METHOD 
The testbed used for this investigation consists of a virtual machine running Windows 7 and an Ubuntu 14.04 
Desktop virtual machine hosting sites containing single and mixed-script domain name. Various versions of the 
web browsers Mozilla Firefox, Chromium, Internet Explorer, and Opera were installed on the Windows 7 virtual 
machine. The versions which are tested consist of various versions from 2011 to 2017, which were not covered 
in the 2012 study. Due to issues obtaining previous versions of Google Chrome, the Chromium browser is used 
for this research. Given the total quantity of browser versions released per year, the versions covered in this 
research consist of those releases mid-year and at the end of the year. As a means of managing the browser versions 
installed on the tested, a snapshot is taken before any browser is installed on the environment. After each browser 
version is tested, the virtual environment is rolled back to the base install to prepare for the next iteration of testing.  
 
Table 2: Test Domain Names 
Domain Name Character Set Domain Name 
Single-Script n0tasecuresite.com 
Mixed-Script nоtasecuresite.com 
 
To perform this test in a controlled environment, two distinct websites were created, these were hosted on an 
Apache web server. The domain names of these sites were configured to use single-script and mixed-script 
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characters. The domain names used in the test are shown in Table 2. The single-script domain uses the Latin 
character ‘0’ in place of an ‘o’, while the mixed-script site uses the U1086 Cryllic ‘о’ character. These sites are 
also using self-signed Secure Socket Layer (SSL) certificates which also correspond to the single-script and 
mixed-script characters used in the domain names. Finally, both the sites are configured to use Geolocation 
services which prompt the user to share their current location with the given domain. Through hosting websites 
using single-script and mixed-script character sets, It is possible to assess the mitigation techniques applied to the 
two domains securely.  
To test the effectiveness of the mitigation methods applied to each browser version, four common attack vectors 
were identified corresponding to browser locations where the output is either the standard Unicode format or 
Punycode. This mitigation tactic is used to convey information to the user, regarding if any non-standard ASCII 
characters are detected. Through assessing various browser features, the research demonstrates how effective each 
browser is in conveying this information to the end user. These attack vectors used in this investigation are:  
 
 The text shown in the browser’s address bar, after the “Go” (or equivalent) button has been pressed.  
 The text shown in the browser’s status bar while the mouse is hovering over a hyperlink.  
 The text shown when viewing prominent information about the website’s SSL certificate.  
 The text shown when the user is prompted to share their location using geolocation services. 
 
As a means to assess how effective each browser version is with mitigating homograph attacks, a revised 
mitigation rating table similar to those presented in the 2012 study is provided. A value of zero was assigned 
should the browser not support a particular attack vector, for example, geolocation services. A value of negative 
one is given if a browser has implemented an attack vector, but is still open to homograph attacks. A value of 
positive one is given if a browser has implemented an attack vector and mitigated homograph attacks. Should the 
browser support or not support mitigation methods when displaying text in the browsers address bar, a value of 
positive two or negative two is given for this value. This value is due to this vector being the most prominent 
location for displaying Punycode. The browsers will receive two distinct ratings for single script and mixed-script 
mitigation.  An example of the table used can be viewed in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Mitigation Table Structure 
Address Bar Status Bar SSL Certificate Location Request 
-2 (No mitigation) -1 (No mitigation) -1 (No mitigation) -1 (No mitigation) 
0 (No Support) 0 (No Support) 0 (No Support) 0 (No Support) 
+2 (Mitigated) +1 (Mitigated) +1 (Mitigated) +1 (Mitigated) 
RESULTS  
The post-2011 versions of Internet Explorer, as shown in Table 4, demonstrated improvements to mitigating 
Homograph attacks. Following the introduction of geolocation services in version 9, version 10 incorporated a 
Punycode mitigation method for mixed-script attacks. Internet Explorer has yet to implement a method of 
displaying Punycode for the SSL certificate, therefore not all mitigation methods have been implemented in the 
browser as of yet. Internet Explorer provides no method of mitigating against single script attacks, as no 
notification was given when supplementing a Latin ‘o’ and a ‘0’.  
As with Internet Explorer, single-script mitigation techniques are not present in any version of Firefox shown in 
Table 5. Version 17 of Firefox was not capable of displaying any form of Punycode in the address bar, SSL 
certificate, or geolocation request. This finding was likely a bug with versions from that time span, as this issue 
was later fixed. The only other issue with later Firefox versions was a lack of geolocation support present in 
version 26.  
These results of Table 6 show that the Opera browser is highly effective in detecting mixed-script IDNs and 
implementing appropriate mitigation methods to notify the users. As with the other browsers, no support for 
mitigating single script spoofing has been implemented yet.  
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Table 4: Internet Explorer Mitigation Table 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location 
Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
10 (2012 - 09) 
11 (2013 - 10) 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
+3 
 
Table 5: Firefox Mitigation Table 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation  
Status Bar 
Mitigation  
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation  
Location 
Request 
Mitigation  
Mitigation 
Rating  
13 (2012 – 06) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+5 
17 (2012 – 11) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
No Mitigation 
-3 
22 (2013 – 06) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
+5 
26 (2013 – 12) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
No support* -4 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
No Support* +4 
30 (2014 – 06) 
34 (2014 – 12) 
38 (2015 – 05) 
43 (2015 – 12) 
47 (2016 – 06) 
50 (2016 – 11) 
55 (2017 – 08) 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-Script – 
Punycode 
+5 
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Table 6: Opera Mitigation Table 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation 
Status Bar 
Mitigation 
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation 
Location 
Request 
Mitigation 
Mitigation 
Rating 
12 (2012 – 06) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+5 
15 (2013 – 07) Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode  
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
No Support -4 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
No Support +4 
18 (2013 – 11) 
22 (2014 – 06) 
26 (2014 – 12) 
30 (2015 – 06) 
34 (2015 – 12) 
38 (2016 – 06) 
42 (2016 – 12) 
47 (2017 – 08) 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+5 
 
 
Table 7: Chromium Mitigation Table 
Version & 
Release Date 
Address Bar 
Mitigation  
Status Bar 
Mitigation  
SSL 
Certificate 
Mitigation  
Location 
Request 
Mitigation  
Mitigation 
Rating  
20.0.1123 
(2012 – 05) 
25.0.1323.1 
(2012 – 11) 
29.0.1541.0 
(2013 – 06) 
32.0.1700.6 
(2013 – 11) 
37.0.2017.2 
(2014 – 05) 
41.0.2243.0 
(2014 – 12) 
45.0.2431.0 
(2015 – 06) 
49.0.2593.0 
(2015 – 12) 
53.0.2763.0 
(2016 – 05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+5 
56.0.2902.0 
(2016 – 10) 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Support 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-4 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
No Support 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+4 
61.0.3153.0 
(2017 – 09) 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
Single Script – 
No Support 
Single Script – 
No Mitigation 
-4 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
Mixed-script – 
No Support 
Mixed-script – 
Punycode 
+4 
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The results from Table 7 show that Chromium is highly effective in mitigating against IDN homograph attacks. 
Like the other browsers analysed, no support for single-script mitigation has been added to any version. Chromium 
was shown to be highly consistent with the mitigation functions applied to each browser version. However, the 
most recent version of the browser does not accurately convey SSL certificate information to the user. This 
limitation results in the browser being unable to display Punycode for the domain name used in the SSL certificate. 
The results from single-script mitigation are demonstrated in Figure 1. Given the lack of mitigation functions, 
each browser received a negative mitigation rating. The most consistent rating across all browsers was a -5. The 
versions which achieved a -4 rating were as a result of a lack of support for a given for that version.  
 
 
Figure 2 - Single-Script Mitigation Results 
 
 
 
Figure 3- Mixed-Script Mitigation Results 
 
The results from mixed-script mitigation are demonstrated in Figure 2. The majority of browser versions 
demonstrate consistent mitigation ratings across different releases. The drops in mitigation ratings appear to be 
from certain versions not supporting for a particular feature. However, the 2012 version of Firefox is shown to 
have the greatest drop in mitigation rating. This finding is a result of the version only displaying Punycode for the 
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hover feature of Hyperlinks. The issues discovered in this version were later amended in later versions, with the 
only other drop being the lack of geolocation support in the 2013 version. Internet Explorer has demonstrated a 
greater mitigation rating in later versions by implementing geolocation services. Opera was shown to be the most 
effective in implementing mitigation features for IDN homograph attacks, as it received the rating of +5 more 
consistently than the other browsers tested.  
The uptake rate of new browser versions plays a significant role in determining the potential exposure of any 
particular browser version to hostile actors. A study conducted by Ion, Reeder, and Consolvo (2015) compared 
the cyber security practices of expert and non-expert users. One major finding of the study was that largest point 
of difference between the groups, was the importance placed on installing software updates in a timely fashion 
(Ion et al., 2015). Examining W3Counter data on browser usage shows us that as of August 2017, that 25.84% of 
users were running web browsers more than three months old (W3Counter, 2017). As such we can see that the 
potential exposure for vulnerabilities in specific browser versions, such as those seen in Firefox in 2012, may span 
many months from release of the software. 
CONCLUSION   
The results discovered in this research are representative of how IDN mitigation techniques have been 
implemented in various browsers in recent years. In extending the results of the previous study by Hannay and 
Baatard (2012), the results found in this study appear to indicate that mixed-script homograph attack mitigation 
has become a standard feature for most browsers. The majority of browsers analysed in this study demonstrated 
to implement appropriate mitigation techniques for IDN homograph attacks. The only degree of variance in the 
mixed-script results appears to be with different versions of particular browsers, which could be a result of bugs 
or changes in the algorithm. The results for single-script mitigation demonstrate that this is not a feature commonly 
implemented in browsers. Of the browsers analysed, none provided any support to notify the end user about a 
non-standard character being used in the domain name. This research suggests that mitigation against mixed-script 
homograph attacks has become a common feature for most browsers, while implementation of mitigation 
functionality for single-script spoofing attacks has not been undertaken. 
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